Continuous Authentication of Wearable Device Users from Heart Rate,
  Gait, and Breathing Data by Cheung, William & Vhaduri, Sudip
Continuous Authentication of Wearable Device Users from
Heart Rate, Gait, and Breathing Data
William Cheung and Sudip Vhaduri
Fordham University, Bronx, NY 10458, USA
{wcheung5, svhaduri}@fordham.edu
Abstract— The security of private information is becom-
ing the bedrock of an increasingly digitized society. While
the users are flooded with passwords and PINs, these gold-
standard explicit authentications are becoming less popular
and valuable. Recent biometric-based authentication methods,
such as facial or finger recognition, are getting popular due
to their higher accuracy. However, these hard-biometric-based
systems require dedicated devices with powerful sensors and
authentication models, which are often limited to most of the
market wearables. Still, market wearables are collecting various
private information of a user and are becoming an integral
part of life: accessing cars, bank accounts, etc. Therefore,
time demands a burden-free implicit authentication mechanism
for wearables using the less-informative soft-biometric data
that are easily obtainable from modern market wearables. In
this work, we present a context-dependent soft-biometric-based
authentication system for wearables devices using heart rate,
gait, and breathing audio signals. From our detailed analysis
using the “leave-one-out” validation, we find that a lighter k-
Nearest Neighbor (k-NN) model with k = 2 can obtain an
average accuracy of 0.93±0.06, F1 score 0.93±0.03, and false
positive rate (FPR) below 0.08 at 50% level of confidence, which
shows the promise of this work.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Internet of Things (IoT) have increasing access to a
multitude of devices with advanced capabilities that allow us
to remotely collect information or control physical objects.
Along with the growth of IoT, smartphones and wearables
have advanced in their sensing and computational capabilities
to a point which enable many new applications and usage
scenarios to emerge [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]. Some include the
ability to identify a user to third party services [6], store
sensitive user information (i.e., passwords, credit card infor-
mation) [7], manage financial payments [8], access phones
and other paired devices [9], unlock vehicles [7], monitor
or track individuals (e.g., child monitoring or fall detection),
and assess an individual’s health and fitness. According to a
recent market report, a 72.7% increase in wearable shipments
and an associated increase in sales revenue of 78.1% are
predicted from 2016 to 2022 [10].
However, wearables also raise new challenges, especially
in terms of security. Unauthorized access to a wearable can
enable imposters to steal information from other sensitive
IoT objects, which poses a significant risk [11]. Illustrations
include, the stealing of sensitive personal information or
delivering faulty dosage of a drug to a remote patient.
Therefore, there is an imperative need for a robust and
accurate authentication mechanism specifically for wearable
device users. Existing wearable devices either have no au-
thentication systems or authentication mechanisms that are
often knowledge-based regular PIN locks or pattern locks [7],
which suffer from scalability issues [12]. Many times,
users opt to completely disable security mechanisms out of
convenience, as the design hinders the implementation of
security itself. However, an implicit and continuous authen-
tication system does not require any explicit user input, and
thereby, such an authentication can work seamlessly without
imposing any user burden.
B. Related Work
1) Wearable Constraints: Wearable device user authen-
tication is a relatively new field of research compared to
mobile authentication [6], [13], [14], [12]. The limited dis-
play sizes of wearables add another constraint that limits
the choices of authentication mechanisms [6], [15]. But
as technology advances, companies such as Samsung, Fit-
bit, Apple, Garmin, and Embrace can provide lower level
granularity in data. In addition to this, increasingly more
biometrics are available as more sensors are being added
such as microphone, electrocardiograms (ECG), and GPS.
However, some of the newer sensors, such as ECG are not
yet accurate enough. For example, researchers have found
that, although for people over the age of 85 Apple accurately
detects atrial fibrillation at a rate of 96%, for people under
55, it only correctly diagnoses atrial fibrillation 19.6% of
the time [16]. Another group of researchers designed wrist
strapped ECG reader and developed an authentication system
with an accuracy of 93.5%, which is limited by the ease of
use and placement issues [17]. Therefore, an authentication
scheme that can utilize data from different sensors, such
as photo-plethysmography (PPG), accelerometer, gyroscope,
and microphone, which are readily available on market
wearables, could be more realistic to develop a non-stop
implicit wearable authentication system.
2) Multi-modal Biometric Authentication: In previous
work, combinations of biometrics were used to form multi-
modal biometric authentication systems for increased reli-
ability compared to unimodal systems, which often suffer
from noisy data, intra-class variations, inter-class similari-
ties, and spoof attacks [18]. For multi-modal authentication
systems, researchers have utilized different hard- and soft-
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biometrics. However, due to accuracy concerns in sens-
ing capabilities and relatively low computational power of
wearables, these multi-modal approaches are typically not
implemented for implicit and continuous authentication on
state-of-the-art wearables.
3) Wearable Authentication: Researchers recently pro-
posed authentication techniques that are more suitable for
wearables, focusing more on approaches based on behavioral
biometrics, such as gait [19], [20], [21], activity types [6],
[11], gesture [22], keystroke dynamics [23] and physiological
biometrics, such as PPG signals [24]. Almost all of these
studies are based on project specific generated datasets.
All of these user authentication techniques are limited in
the scope of use, e.g., gait-based behavioral authentication
approaches [20], [21] only work during walking. While other
projects have addressed some of the limitations of gait-based
approaches by considering different types of gestures [22]
or activities [6], [11]. All of these models are based on
movement and thereby, fail to work in the very common
human state of being sedentary [23], [15]. Authentication
approaches using physiological biometric data, such as ECG
and bioimpedance [14] require very fine-grained samples and
sensor readings are easily affected by noise, motion, etc.,
but these biometrics are always available. Focusing on one
or a particular set of biometrics restricts the usability of a
continuous authentication model, but with a collection of
various combinations it is possible to build a more robust
authentication system.
C. Contributions
The main contribution of this paper is an exploration of
implicit and non-stop user authentication schemes utilizing
multiple biometrics. In this approach, we use three different
types of soft-biometrics: heart rate, gait, and breathing all of
which are easily obtainable on most of the market wearables.
While minute-level coarse-grained heart rate samples can
be less informative, they are available almost all the time
when a user wears the device. Adding another biometric,
such as gait, can improve the performance. However, unlike
the heart rate data, gait is available only when a user walks.
Compared to gait, breathing audio signal can have a better
availability, but it also suffers from various issues, such as
a user’s distance from the microphone, presence of other
sounds. Therefore, it is important to develop an authentica-
tion approach that can combine multiple biometrics based on
contexts or scenarios, e.g., availability of biometrics, and can
be easy to implement on wearables. In this work, we present
a multi-biometric-based context-driven approach that works
both in sedentary and non-sedentary periods (Section II).
From our detailed feature computation and selection, hyper-
parameter optimization, and finally, modeling with different
classifiers, we are able to authenticate a user with an average
accuracy of 0.93± 0.06, F1 score 0.93± 0.03 (Section III-
D), and FPR below 0.08 at 50% level of confidence while
classifying (Section III-E).
II. APPROACH
In this paper, we intend to demonstrate the importance
and effectiveness of different biometrics to identify wearable-
users using machine learning modeling. Before we describe
the details of the analysis, we first introduce the datasets,
pre-processing steps, feature engineering, and methods used
in this work.
A. Datasets
We use three different datasets in our analysis.
• Fitbit dataset: We use the heart rate data collected at a
rate of one sample per minute using the Fitbit Charge
HR device from three subjects similar to our previous
work [25], [26], [27], [15], [28], [29], [30], [31], [32],
[33], [34], [35], [36], [37], [38]. Data was collected
during various activity levels ranging from sedentary
to high activity.
• Gait dataset: We use the WISDM dataset [39], where
three (i.e., x, y, z directions) linear and angular accel-
eration readings were collected from accelerometer and
gyroscope, respectively, at a rate of one sample in 50 ms
from the LG G Watch with Wear 1.5 operating system.
Data was collected under normal walking condition.
• Audio dataset: In this work, we use the breathing audio
clips obtained from the ESC-50 dataset [40], where
audio clips were, sampled at 22.05 kHz, around 5
seconds long. Data was collected, holding a device close
to a subject during an idle state.
B. Data Pre-Processing
Since we are using real-world datasets, we need to process
the dataset before using it. First, we need to segment the
continuous stream of biometrics, such as heart rate, gait
information, and desired audio events (i.e., breathing). Then,
we perform data augmentation to simulate more physiolog-
ical states from the collected data to increase robustness
of experiment. Finally, we compute and select influential
features before constructing authentication models.
1) Data Segmentation: Since heart rate and gait data were
sampled at different frequencies, we segment the heart rate
and gait samples into 10-sample windows to obtain stable
and rich information. Unlike the heart rate or gait data, the
audio data comes with other types of sounds in addition to
desired breathing sounds. Additionally, some clips come with
multiple breathing events separated by silence or noisy parts.
Therefore, we segment the ESC-50 audio clips to fetch single
inhalation breathing events. Thereby, we obtain around six
inhalation breathing events per subject.
2) Audio Data Augmentation: Breathing audio could be
altered due to change of environments, physical state, or
mood. To simulate this and capture the variations, we aug-
ment the original audio breathing events using various pitch
shifts and speed changes.
• Pitch shift: We consider 15 different pitch shifts ranging
from - 72 to
7
2 with
1
2 increments
• Speed change: We consider seven speed changes rang-
ing from .25x to 2x times the speed of an original
clip with an increment of .25x, skipping 1x since that
would represent the original clip, which we have already
included as a pitch shift with value 0.
Thereby, each original breathing clip is augmented using a
total of 22 modifications.
C. Feature Computation
We compute the following sets of candidate features.
• Heart rate features: From the windows of 10 samples
we compute 21 statistical features: mean (µ), median
(Mdn), standard deviation (σ), variance (σ2), coef-
ficient of variance (cov), range (ran), coefficient of
range (coran), first quartile or 25th percent (p25),
third quartile or 75th percent (p75), max (max), inter
quartile range (iqr), coefficient of inter quartile (coi),
mean absolute deviation (mad Mdn), median absolute
deviation (mad µ), energy (E), power (P ), root mean
square (rms), root sum of squares (rss), signal to noise
ratio (snr), skewness (γ), and kurtosis (κ), described
in [37].
• Gait features: We compute mean (µ), variance (σ2), and
kurtosis (κ) from each window of x-, y-, and z-axis
readings obtained from gyroscope and accelerometer,
separately.
• Audio features: From each inhalation breathing event
we compute 40 Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients
(MFCCs), where, MFCCi represents the ith coeffi-
cient.
Thereby, we obtain 21 features from a single heart rate
window, 18 features (i.e., three from the six axes of ac-
celerometer and gyroscope) from a gait window, and 40
features from every breathing clip.
D. Feature Selection
To select the most influential features, we use the Sci-
kit learn feature selection package and apply the three
techniques: Correlation approach, Select from a Model (Se-
lectFromModel), and Select the K Best (SelectKBest). In
each iteration of the leave-one-out training-testing, described
in Section III-A, we select different sets features, which are
very similar with changes in ordering.
• Correlation approach: We apply this approach to select
the most influential heart rate and gait features. We find
mean, variance, and skewness are the three uncorrelated
features from both heart rate. Therefore, we remain with
three heart rate features.
• Select from a Model (SelectFromModel): In this ap-
proach, we use the Random Forest Models. This feature
selection approach provides a relative importance of
features in percentages.
• Select the K Best (SelectKBest): This is our last feature
selection approach that also provides an importance
score for each feature and based on that score we rank
the features. Then, we try with different numbers of
features, i.e., K, to find the best model performance. In
this work, we find K = 10 performs the best.
Tables I presents the list of best feature sets obtained from
different biometrics using different selection approaches.
Table II presents the lists of selected features obtained using
different selection approaches during one of the leave-one-
out training-testing cases (Section III-A) considering heart
rate, gait, and breathing features together.
Fig. 1: Proposed wearable device user authentication scheme
E. Methods
In Figure 1, we present an overview of our proposed
implicit and continuous wearable-user authentication scheme
utilizing various combinations of three biometrics (heart rate,
gait, and breathing patterns) which are easily obtainable from
most of the market wearables. The proposed system uses
different collections of the three biometrics based on their
availability and model confidence.
We first try to authenticate a user based on the heart rate
obtained from the photo-plethysmogram (PPG) sensor. If the
system can authenticate the user with enough confidence, it
allows the user to access the device. Otherwise, it checks the
next authentication module that relies on other biometrics.
The authentication system first tries to check whether
the user is moving using the on-device accelerometer and
gyroscope data. If the user is moving, the system tries to au-
thenticate the user based on gait and heart rate biometrics. If
the system can authenticate the user with enough confidence,
it allows the user to access the device.
However, if the user does not move or the gait and heart
rate-based module cannot authenticate the user, the system
tries to combine breathing biometric collected from the on-
device microphone. Based on the way the authentication
system reaches the breathing module, it either combines
breathing with only heart rate biometric or both heart rate
and gait biometrics.
Similar to the previous cases, the system in breathing
module tries to authenticate the user. If the system can
authenticate the user with enough confidence, it allows the
user to access the device. Otherwise, the user’s access to
TABLE I: Summary of features selected from different biometrics
Biometrics Selector (parameters) Selected features
Heart rate SelectKBest (K = 10) p25, µ, rss, rms, max, Mdn, p75, κ, γ, P
Heart rate and gait SelectFromModel (p = 0.90) Z-gy κ, Y-gy κ, Y-acc µ, µ, Z-gy σ2, Z-acc κ, X-acc κ, Y-gy σ2,
Y-acc κ, X-acc µ, X-acc σ2, Z-acc σ2, Y-acc σ2
Heart rate and breathing SelectKBest (K = 10) MFCC3, MFCC7, MFCC4, MFCC6, MFCC9, MFCC11, MFCC15,
MFCC38, MFCC13, MFCC40
TABLE II: Summary of features selected from heart rate, gait, and breathing biometrics together
Selector (parameters) Selected features
SelectFromModel (p = 0.90) MFCC3, MFCC4, MFCC7, MFCC1, MFCC6, Z-gy κ, MFCC9, Y-acc µ, MFCC13, Y-gy κ, Z-acc κ,
MFCC10, MFCC15, X-acc κ, MFCC11, MFCC18, MFCC36, MFCC38, MFCC26, MFCC17, MFCC12,
MFCC14, Z-gy σ2, µ,
SelectKBest (K = 10) MFCC3, MFCC7, MFCC4, MFCC6, MFCC1, Y-acc µ, MFCC9, MFCC38, MFCC2, MFCC11
the device is revoked and require some sort of external
verification, such as pin locks or passwords.
Based on the various combinations of the three biometrics
that we use in our authentication approach, we define the
following models:
• Heart rate data-driven model (HR model)
• Heart rate and gait data-driven model (HRG model)
• Heart rate and breathing data-driven model (HRB
model)
• Heart rate, gait, and breathing data-driven model
(HRGB model)
III. USER AUTHENTICATION
Before presenting the detailed evaluation of our models,
we first present training-testing set split and our modeling
scheme, followed by list of performance measures and hyper-
parameter optimization.
A. Training-Testing Set
In our binary modeling, we try to distinguish a valid user
(class 0) from the two impostors (class 1). To avoid over-
fitting, we consider at least 10 times more data-points, i.e.,
instances than the number of features. While training-testing,
we follow the “leave-one-out” strategy, where we keep one
instance for testing and use the rest of the N − 1 instances
for training with N be the number of total instances from
each class. We balance our training dataset, by considering
the same N − 1 number of instances from each class. Since
our imposter class (class 1) consists of two person data, we
pick (N − 1)/2 instances from each imposter. Similarly, we
balance our test sets. While adding the augmented data into
train and test sets, we follow the same split that we consider
on original data. For example, if a user has N = 6 breathing
events and in our “leave-one-out” approach, we use the first
five instances for training and the sixth instance for testing,
then the breathing events that are generated from the first five
events using different augmentation approaches are added to
the training set. Similarly, events that are generated from the
sixth breathing event are added to the test set. This way, we
keep our training and testing instances mutually exclusive.
B. Performance Measures
To evaluate the performance of different models we con-
sider Accuracy (ACC), Root Mean Square Error (RMSE),
False Positive Rate (FPR), False Negative Rate (FNR), F1
score, and Area Under the Curve - Receiver Operating
Characteristic (AUC-ROC). Terminologies have their usual
meaning in machine learning, when classifying a subject
using a feature set [37], [41]. For an ideal system, it is
desirable to have a lower RMSE, FPR and FNR, but a higher
ACC, F1 score, and AUC-ROC.
C. Hyper-Parameter Optimization
We use the grid search package in the Sci-kit learn to find
the optimal hyper-parameter sets. For each “leave-one-out”
modeling, we perform the hyper-parameter optimization
using various ranges of values. From the different iterations
of the “leave-one-out” approach with balanced mutually
exclusive training-test sets, we obtain similar values for the
hyper-parameters. In Tables III and IV, we present the set of
optimal values obtained from different modeling approaches.
D. Authentication Model Evaluation
In Table III, we present the performance of the best models
using various biometric combinations and different classifiers
with their optimal parameter sets. From the table, we observe
that the best HR model (i.e., model that only uses heart rate
data) can provide an average accuracy of 0.61 ± 0.18 and
an average AUC-ROC 0.54± 0.07. As discussed previously
in the Section II-E, if the HR model cannot authenticate a
user with enough confidence or fails to authenticate, we use
additional gait biometric (i.e., HRG model).
In Table III, we observe that adding gait biometric (when
available) with heart rate, all measures improve. In case of
the best HRG model (i.e., model that uses heart rate and gait
biometrics), ACC increased by 38%, F1 score increased by
218%, and AUC-ROC increased by 56% compared to the
best HR model. The FPR also improves (i.e., drops) from
0.70± 0.20 to 0.26± 0.10. While gait data is only available
while a user is moving, its inclusion can significantly boost
the authentication performance, compared to a model that
uses only less accurate minute-level heart rate data.
In Table III, we observe that the HRB model (i.e., model
that uses heart rate and breathing biometrics) achieves a
TABLE III: The best HR, HRG, and HRG models with average and standard deviation of performance measures
Model Classifier (parameters) Feature count ACC RMSE FPR FNR F1 score AUC-ROC
HR SVM (poly. kernel, d = 2, C = 1) 10 0.61 (0.18) 0.62 (0.16) 0.70 (0.20) 0.08 (0.16) 0.27 (0.09) 0.54 (0.07)
HRG RF (number of estimators, n = 500) 13 0.84 (0.09) 0.40 (0.01) 0.26 (0.10) 0.05 (0.03) 0.86 (0.03) 0.84 (0.04)
HRB k-NN (k = 6, minkowski distance) 10 0.91 (0.04) 0.29 (0.04) 0.17 (0.04) 0.00 (0.00) 0.92 (0.03) 0.91 (0.02)
TABLE IV: The best HRGB models with average and standard deviation of performance measures
Classifier (parameters) feature count ACC RMSE FPR FNR F1 score AUC-ROC
RF (n estimators = 450) 23 0.91 (0.04) 0.31 (0.00) 0.19 (0.04) 0.00 (0.00) 0.91 (0.05) 0.91 (0.02)
k-NN (k = 2, minkowski distance) 10 0.93 (0.06) 0.27 (0.01) 0.14 (0.07) 0.00 (0.00) 0.93 (0.03) 0.93 (0.04)
NB 10 0.91 (0.01) 0.30 (0.00) 0.18 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.92 (0.01) 0.91 (0.01)
SVM (poly. kernel, d = 1, C = 1) 10 0.92 (0.03) 0.29 (0.01) 0.17 (0.06) 0.00 (0.00) 0.92 (0.02) 0.92 (0.03)
SVM (rbf kernel, γ = 0.01, C = 1) 10 0.93 (0.03) 0.27 (0.01) 0.15 (0.06) 0.00 (0.00) 0.93 (0.03) 0.93 (0.03)
better performance compared to the HRG model. We achieve
a 35% drop in the FPR while comparing the HRB with the
HRG model. Additionally, we observe ≈ 8% increases, while
comparing the ACC, F1 score, and AUC-ROC of the HRB
model with the HRG model. While comparing the HRB
model to the HR model, we observe a huge performance
improvement. Compared to the HR model, the HRB model
performs better with a F1 score (an increase of 241%) and
AUC-ROC (an increase of 68%) with a high accuracy of
0.91± 0.02.
Finally, in Table IV, we present the performance compar-
ison among different classification models and their optimal
parameter sets using the heart rate, gait, and breathing
biometrics together. In the table, we observe a modest perfor-
mance improvement, i.e., an accuracy increase of accuracy
by 2% (0.91 to 0.93), while comparing the HRGB model
with the HRB model. Similar improvements are observed
in case of other performance metrics. However, in case of
the HRGB model we obtain a simpler and faster classifier,
i.e., the k-NN with k = 2 (number of neighbors needed
for a classification), compared to the HRB model that uses
the k-NN model with k = 6. Therefore, considering the
implementation endowment, i.e., a wearable, that has energy
constraints, an authentication model that uses heart rate, gait,
and breathing biometrics and the k-NN classifier with k = 2
can be a better choice.
Fig. 2: The change of FPR and FNR with varying confidence
thresholds (HRB model with the k-NN classifier)
E. Error Analysis
As discussed previously in Section II-E, the authentication
system allows a user to access the device only when it can
Fig. 3: The change of FPR and FNR with varying confidence
thresholds (HRGB model with the k-NN classifier)
validate the user with enough confidence. In this section,
we present an analysis on how our system performs with
the change of confidence level, i.e., threshold. In case of an
ideal system, it is desired to have a lower FPR and FNR. In
Figures 2 and 3, we present our analysis of error rates (FPR
and FNR) with varying confidence thresholds. In Figure 2,
we observe that FPR sharply drops with the increase of
thresholds from 0.1 to 0.9 and the FPR drops below 0.05 at
confidence threshold 0.9. However, in Figure 3, we observe a
sharp drop between threshold values of 0.4 and 0.5. The FPR
drops from 0.14 to 0.08 during this increase of threshold and
FPR remains steady before and after that change in threshold.
Though the FPR in case of HRGB model remains a little bit
high compared to the HRB model, but the HRGB model
needs a smaller confidence threshold of 0.5 to achieve this
FPR and at this 0.5 confidence threshold HRGB model can
drop the FPR ≈ 54% compared to the HRB model (i.e., FPR
of 0.08 versus 0.175). Therefore, it is desirable to use an
authentication model that uses heart rate, gait, and breathing
biometrics with a low confidence threshold of 0.5.
IV. LIMITATIONS, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSIONS
Our work tested the feasibility of authenticating users
implicitly and continuously based on the three separate
biometrics, i.e., heart rate, gait, and breathing, that are easily
obtainable in most of the market wearables, which are usu-
ally not equipped with powerful sensors, such as cameras or
fingerprint scanners. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work that attempts to authenticate a wearable device user
without any explicit user burden using three different soft-
biometrics in a more case-based approach, i.e., availability
of data. Through our detailed analysis we show that we can
authenticate a user with an average accuracy of 0.93± 0.06,
F1 score of 0.93±0.03, and AUC-ROC of 0.93±0.04, with
a less than 0.08 FPR at 50% confidence threshold using three
biometrics together. This shows the promise for developing
an implicit and continuous authentication system for the
market wearables to secure our valuable information as well
as to create a safe gateway to access various services and
devices.
This work has some limitations, which we plan to ad-
dress in the future. First, we have limited number of au-
dio breathing clips. However, we increase the data volume
using standard audio augmentation approaches. Second, in
this feasibility work, we use a set of three subjects. We
perform a leave-one-out validation approach to deal with this
limitation and our achieved performance measures show a
promise to further investigate this with a large-scale extended
period study. Third, we use different datasets, which could
affect the performance. However, we use three independent
biometrics and perform correlation analysis to select un-
correlated features; thereby, our results potentially shows
a baseline performance, which could further be improved
by using the three biometrics from the same subject since
that could more uniquely identify a user compared to our
case. Before mass deployment, there needs a study for an
extended period with several subjects to incorporate user
variability and behavior changes over time. Finally, more
advanced modeling techniques such as deep learning models
(recurrent neural networks or convolutional neural networks)
may further improve the accuracy of the models, but that will
require to off load data from the wearable to server, which
can lead to additional challenges to secure; therefore, our
approach of using lighter machine learning models, such as
the k-NN with k = 2, have a higher scope to implement on
the wearables.
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